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The requirement that a defendant have effective assistance of
counsel in the preparation for trial 28 finds its realization in this
decision. The language of the decision could be interpreted to mean
that incriminating statements made in the absence of counsel after
indictment will not be admitted into evidence in any case. However,
it appears unlikely that the decision will be interpreted by the Court
of Appeals quite so broadly in its future decisions on this subject.
Since Di Biasi, the Court of Appeals in People v. Downs,29 a memo-
randum decision, affirmed a first degree murder conviction, despite
the fact that certain admissions obtained after indictment and in the
absence of counsel had been received into evidence. Chief Judge
Desmond alone dissented on the basis of Di Biasi. There are, how-
ever, a number of elements which distinguish Downs from Di Biasi.
In Downs, the defendant had not retained counsel prior to the inter-
rogation but had expressly waived his right to counsel.30 He did
not respond to questioning solicited by the Assistant District
Attorney, but instead volunteered the statements.8 ' Furthermore,
at the trial he repeated substantially the same admissions he had
previously made to the police and even added incriminating matter.3 2
Likewise, "defense counsel's opening statement . . . revealed sub-
stantially all the salient features of the statements." 3 Under the
circumstances of Di Biasi, statements made to police after indictment
and in the absence of counsel were inadmissible, even though the
defendant did not request the presence of his counsel. Under what
other circumstances the principle of Di Biasi will be applied is a
question which will have to await clarification by the Court of Appeals.
A
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-MARITAL DEDUCTION-ELECTION TO
DEDUCT ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES FROM INCOME RATHER THAN
GROSS ESTATE, AS INFLUENCING MARITAL DEDUCTION BEQUEST.
UPHELD.-Testator bequeathed to his widow a fund equal to one-half
the entire value of his adjusted gross estate, all taxes to be taken
28 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); People v. McLaughlin, 291
N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
29 8 N.Y.2d 860, 168 N.E.2d 710, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, cert. denied, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 3111 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1960).
30 Supplemental Brief for Respondent, pp. 2-3, People v. Downs, supra note
29.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 5.
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from the residuary.1 The residuary was to go into trusts with the
income payable for life to the son and grandson respectively, re-
mainders to their respective issue. The will further provided that
values, for all purposes, should correspond to those finally determined
for federal estate tax purposes. The executors, in order to obtain
an over-all tax saving and pursuant to an allowable election, chose to
deduct administration expenses on the estate income tax return rather
than on its estate tax return. This election enhanced the adjusted
gross estate and therefore the widow's bequest, but it caused a detri-
ment to the residuary estate. On objection by interested remainder-
men of the residuary trusts, the Surrogate's Court held the election
proper and the widow entitled to the resulting increased bequest.
However, since the residuary was depleted by the increased estate
taxes, the Court directed that it be reimbursed to that extent out of
the income interests of all trusts.2 In re McTarnahan, 202 N.Y.S.2d
618 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
The adjusted gross estate became a significant phrase to estate
planners in 1948. At that time the Internal Revenue Code was
amended 3 to provide that, in computing an estate tax, a marital de-
duction would be allowed in an amount equal to the value of any
interest in property 4 included in the gross estate 5 which passes to
the surviving spouse. However, this deduction was not to exceed
fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate.6 Thus the value of the
" In June 1954, a decree was entered placing the burden of paying taxes
on the residuary estate. Matter of McTarnahan, 130 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Surr.
Ct. 1954). See N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 200.
2In re McTarnahan, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (Surr. Ct. 1960). This
report, dated April 22, 1960, uses the words ". . . restoration to the residuary
estate of the benefit obtained by the election to take the administration expense
credit against income taxes." This wording was obviously inaccurate in light
of what was said before in the opinion, and the final decree on accounting
settling the account, filed Aug. 29, 1960, File #2988-1951 read as follows:
"There must be restored to the principal of the estate herein accounted for
out of income thereof the amount of federal estate taxes paid with respect
to the taxable estate of the said decedent in excess of the amount of such
taxes which would have been payable but for the election." (Emphasis added.)
The total amount restored to the residuary as a result was $1,193.22.
3Revenue Act of 1948, § 361, 62 Stat. 117 (1948) (now INT. REv. CODE
oF 1954, § 2056). Hereafter the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will be cited
as CoDe.
4 Certain terminable interests are not included in the deduction. CODE
§ 2056(b).
5 Gross estate includes all property real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated, except real property outside of the United States. CODE§§ 2031-44.
6 CODE § 2056(c) (1). The purpose of this amendment was to equalize
estate tax benefits between residents of community property states and those
of non-community property states. See, e.g., Garland & Garrity, The Federal
Death Tax and How To Live With I, 30 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 1, 28-29 (1955) ;
Lefever, The Marital Deduction, 89 TRusTs & EsTATEs 644 (1950); Shove,
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adjusted gross estate became the determinant of how much a testator
may bequeath to his or her surviving spouse tax free, and, with the
same bequest, substantially reduce the taxable estate. This adjusted
gross estate is defined in the Internal Revenue Code as the value of
the estate after certain expenses, including administration expenses,
have been deducted from the gross estate. 7
As a result of this marital deduction provision, estate planners,
wishing to take full advantage of it while not knowing what the
exact value of the estate would be at death, have utilized what is
known as a marital deduction "formula clause." 8 It provides, in
essence, that the surviving spouse is to receive fifty per cent of the
adjusted gross estate. However, a serious problem concerning this
bequest is posed by another provision of the Code. Section 64 2 (g)
allows executors, pursuant to certain stipulations, 9 to deduct admin-
istration expenses on the estate income tax return rather than, and
to the exclusion of, deducting them from the gross estate for estate
tax purposes.10 By exercising this option, the executors may, de-
pending upon the size of the estate and its income, obtain a greater
tax saving for the overall estate than would have resulted had the
deduction been taken from the gross estate for estate tax purposes."
Marital Deduction Under the Revenue Act of 1948, N.Y.S.B.A. BuLL. 156
(1948).
7 CODE § 2056(c) (2).8 For an example of such a clause, see Lefever, supra note 6, at 707-08.
1 Executors must file a statement to the effect that deductions claimed on
the estate income tax return have not also been claimed as deductions on the
estate tax return and also that they waive their right to claim them as deduc-
tions on that return. CoDE § 642(g).
'CODE § 642(g).
1Assuming all other deductions and exemptions have been taken, if the
gross estate were $500,000 and the estate income were $30,000 and the only
remaining deduction allowable on either tax return were $5,000 in adminis-
tration expenses, the following should illustrate the possible tax saving:
Deducted from Gross Estate Not Deducted from Gross Estate
Gross estate $500,000 Estate tax on $500,000 is
Less admin. exp. - 5,000 $145,700.
$495,000
Estate tax on $495,000 is
$144,100.
By deducting the administration expenses from the gross estate, $1,600 could
be saved on the estate tax.
Deducted from Income Not Deducted from Income
Income $30,000 Income tax on $30,000 is
Less admin. exp. - 5,000 $13,220.
$25,000




However, when these administration expenses are not deducted
from the gross estate, the adjusted gross estate will be increased by
the amount of these expenses and the surviving spouse's marital de-
duction bequest increased by one-half this amount. This in turn
would reduce the residuary estate as follows:
(1) Since the surviving spouse receives a greater amount,
the residuary estate is lessened by the amount of the increment.
(2) Since the administration expense deduction is lost to
the estate tax return, the estate taxes are higher. Where the
estate taxes are to be paid out of the residuary (a correlative
provision to formula clauses), the distributable residuary is fur-
ther reduced by the amount of the tax increase.
Obviously, where the income beneficiaries are different from
those interested in the remainder, several problems arise in the settling
of an estate where the testator has used the formula clause and the
executors have exercised the option available to them through 642 (g).
Some of these problems have arisen in fairly recent Surrogate's pro-
ceedings,12 and the results may be of interest to estate planners.
In re Warms 13 involved a will which did not contain a formula
clause but did provide that all taxes be paid out of the residuary
estate. The executors, in the accounting, charged administration ex-
penses to principal but deducted them on the estate income tax return
to obtain the greater tax benefits. This increased the estate taxes.
The contingent remaindermen of the residuary trusts contended that
since income beneficiaries had benefited from the election, adminis-
tration expenses should be charged to income in the accounting or,
in the alternative, that as these expenses were in fact charged to
principal, the principal account should at least be reimbursed with
the saving which would have resulted in federal estate tax had said
expenses been deducted from principal in computing that tax. The
court held that these administration expenses could not be charged
to income,14 but it granted the alternative request.1 Thus. it seems
By deducting the administration expenses from income, $3,070 could be saved
on the income tax, $1,470 more than could be saved in estate tax.
Because of the difference in the graduation of rates for income tax and
estate tax, the advantage of deducting these expenses from income depends
upon the size of the estate and its income.
221n re McTarnahan, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Inman,
196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct. 1959); Matter of Levy, 9 Misc.2d 561, 167
N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct.
1955).
13 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
14 The court cited In re Chave, 227 App. Div. 554, 238 N.Y. Supp. 678
(1st Dep't 1930), which held that general administration expenses should be
payable from principal. The court in the Warns case stated that "the option
granted by the Internal Revenue Code to the executors, even when exercised,
cannot affect the propriety of the charge of administration expenses to
principal." 1n re Warms, supra note 12, at 170-71.
15 In re Warms, supra note 12, at 171.
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the court will allow the executors to use the option and reduce in-
come taxes, but principal is not to be penalized by the resultant in-
crease in the estate tax.
But what of the case where the will contains a formula clause for
the marital deduction bequest? If the option is exercised, will the
residuary be penalized to the extent of the surviving spouse's
increment?
Matter of Levy 16 concerned a will in which the testator be-
queathed to his widow an amount "for which a marital deduction is
or will be allowed in the computation of my net estate" 17 and which
would "aggregate a sum equivalent to one-half of my adjusted gross
estate." 18 The executors deducted administration expenses on the
income tax return and saved the income account twenty-five thousand
dollars. However, this election depleted the residuary by seven thou-
sand dollars in additional estate taxes plus the amount of the widow's
increased bequest. The residuary legatees objected to this depletion
and Surrogate DiFalco sustained their contentions. He held that
the residuary legatees were to receive as much as they would have
if administration expenses had been deducted on the estate tax return
and that the widow's bequest was to be reduced by the amount she
gained as a result of the election. Said the Surrogate: "Thus the
election has caused a different result for tax purposes than for ac-
counting purposes. . . ." 19 An interesting shadow lurks between
the lines of this quotation. It is the shadow of the estate tax col-
lector and one must wonder what his reaction would have been if,
upon reading the decision in Levy, he had learned that there was de-
ducted from the taxable estate a greater amount for the widow's be-
quest than the widow actually received? Would he have demanded
a corrected estate tax return from the executors on which the marital
deduction would be an amount which the widow actually received?
These questions may never be answered because the surrogate's
court has recently decided two similar cases and has apparently de-
cided to take a different position from that taken in Levy. In re
Innan2o and the instant case both involved formula clauses, and in
both the executors exercised the option available to them. In Innan,
the testator bequeathed to his wife a trust in an amount equal to
one-half of the value of the "adjusted gross estate as that term was de-
fined in section 812(e) (2)" 21 of the Internal Revenue Code (1939).
The court ordered that her bequest was to be one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate as computed for federal estate tax purposes and
not one-half of the amount which the adjusted gross estate would
16!9 Misc.2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
17 Id. at 563, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
18 Ibid.
is Id. at 564, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
20 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct. 1959).21 Id. at 371.
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have been had all assertible deductions been claimed in the federal
estate tax return. The court also held that the formula clause did
not fall within Section 125 of the Decedent's Estate Law.2 2  The
court gave as its reasons that the testator was obviously tax conscious
and aware of the great distinction between the adjusted gross estate
as defined by the Code and the net estate after paying administration
expenses. "The direction in the will must be given the operative
effect which the testator intended and that is that the marital trust
be fixed in an amount equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate
determined for tax purposes." 23
Thus Levy has apparently been overruled. But in the instant
case, where the will bequeathed to the widow a fund equal to one-
half of the entire value of the adjusted gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes, and also provided that all values should be as finally
determined for estate tax purposes, Surrogate DiFalco distinguished
the Levy case by holding that the formula clause before him more
specifically provided for the determination of values than the clause
in Levy. He then proceeded to sustain the widow's increased be-
quest, but directed that the residuary should be reimbursed out of
income to the extent that the estate taxes were increased by the
election.
Inman and the instant case fairly well establish that the surviv-
ing spouse's bequest will be allowed to stand at the amount deter-
mined by the adjusted gross estate figure on the federal estate tax
return, where the formula clause specifically so provides, even if the
option allowed by 64 2 (g) of the Code is exercised. The residuary
estate will then be reimbursed out of income to the extent that it
was depleted by the increased estate taxes. It is submitted that, even
if, as in the case of Levy, the testator's intention to take advantage of
the maximum marital deduction is only inferred, Inman and the in-
stant case indicate that the surviving spouse's bequest will be allowed
to stand at the amount determined by the adjusted gross estate figure
on the federal estate tax return.
EVIDENCE - WIRETAPPING- INJUNCTION AGAINST USE OF
WIRETAP EVIDENCE IN STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DENIED.-
Petitioner, indicted by a New York grand jury, brought an action in
22 The attempted grant to an executor of the power to make a binding and
conclusive fixation of the value of any asset for purposes of distribution or
allocation or otherwise is against public policy. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 125.
23 In re Inman, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369, 372 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
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